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This study examines firms' decoupling of informal prac- 
tices from formally adopted policies through analysis of 
the implementation of stock repurchase programs by 
large U.S. corporations in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
when firms were experiencing external pressures to 
adopt policies that demonstrate corporate control over 
managerial behavior. We develop theory to explain varia- 
tion in the responses of firms to such pressures, i.e., why 
some firms acquiesce by actually implementing stock 
repurchase programs, while others decouple formally 
adopted repurchase programs from actual corporate 
investments, so that the plans remain more symbolic 
than substantive. Results of a longitudinal study of stock 
repurchase programs over a six-year time period show 
that decoupling is more likely to occur when top execu- 
tives have power over boards to avoid institutional pres- 
sures for change and when social structural or experien- 
tial factors enhance awareness among powerful actors of 
the potential for organizational decoupling. The study has 
implications for future research on decoupling, organiza- 
tional learning, and corporate governance.0 
In one of the earliest contributions to the development of 
what is now known as institutional theory, Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) proposed that while organizations often adopt formal 
policies, plans, and programs that display conformity to 
socially sanctioned purposes, they may also decouple these 
formal structures from actual, ongoing practices in the organi- 
zation to buffer internal routines from external uncertainties, 
thus enhancing flexibility while still maintaining legitimacy 
with important external constituents. Given the importance of 
decoupling to institutional theories, and a considerable body 
of empirical research over the last two decades that purports 
to test institutional predictions, it is surprising that relatively 
little research has been devoted to the phenomenon of orga- 
nizational decoupling or its specific antecedents (Scott, 1995: 
128). One explanation for this relative paucity of research 
may be the difficulty of observing decoupling of organization- 
al practices across large samples of organizations. In fact, 
prior research examining organizational decoupling as a 
response to institutional processes has been primarily qualita- 
tive and/or case-based. Meyer and Rowan (1977) developed 
the decoupling thesis from their qualitative work on educa- 
tional institutions, which suggested that formally adopted 
standards and procedures, which appeared to address gov- 
ernment mandates and community demands, were decou- 
pled from the on-going routines of teaching and administra- 
tion. More recently, Edelman et al. (1991) found qualitative 
evidence of organizational decoupling in a small liberal arts 
college, where an affirmative action officer who had issued 
formal policy statements conforming to EEO/AA legal require- 
ments was able to preserve discretion over the actual hiring 
and promotion process (see also Elsbach and Sutton, 1992; 
Meyer, 1994). While each of these studies provided valuable 
insights into the details surrounding decoupling, they do not 
predict or explain variation in decoupling or when and where 
decoupling is more or less likely to be found. 
Large-sample, quantitative studies of institutional processes 
have tended to focus on how organizations address institu- 
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tional pressures by adopting (and presumably implementing) 
new programs, policies, or other structures (Oliver, 1991). 
Mezias (1990) examined the environmental and organizational 
factors leading firms to adopt and implement new accounting 
methods, and Haunschild (1993) and Haunschild and Miner 
(1997) offered evidence that institutional uncertainty may 
lead firms to imitate the acquisition strategies of other firms 
to which they have network ties (see also Galaskiewicz and 
Wasserman, 1989; Davis, 1991; Fligstein, 1991; Burns and 
Wholey, 1993). Some research has also explored how con- 
flicting institutional demands may lead organizations to adopt 
conflicting organizational practices (D'Aunno, Sutton, and 
Price, 1991; Peyrot, 1991). But research on the adoption, dif- 
fusion, and institutionalization of formal policies has not 
addressed whether and why organizations adopting such 
new practices may decouple those practices from actual 
activities. Similarly, very little research has sought to explain 
variation in how firms respond to a given set of institutional 
pressures. Stated in terms of Oliver's (1991: 152) typology of 
responses to institutional processes, few studies have devel- 
oped and tested a theoretical explanation for why some firms 
that have formally adopted a policy in response to external 
pressures for change may still act to "avoid" those pressures 
(e.g., by decoupling), while other firms "acquiesce" to institu- 
tional pressures by substantively implementing formal poli- 
cies that address constituents' demands. 
Thus, while we know more about how institutional environ- 
ments provide the impetus for institutionalization, whereby 
firms are socially expected to adopt-and presumably imple- 
ment-various organizational policies (cf. DiMaggio and Pow- 
ell, 1983), we know relatively little about when and to what 
extent institutional decoupling is more likely to occur. West- 
phal and Zajac (1994) conducted perhaps the first large-sam- 
ple investigation into the determinants of institutional decou- 
pling. In a series of studies on executive incentive programs 
(Zajac and Westphal, 1995; Westphal and Zajac, 1998), they 
developed a sociopolitical perspective on decoupling and pro- 
vided evidence that firms were more likely to decouple incen- 
tive programs for chief executive officers (CEOs) from actual 
practice when CEOs were relatively powerful vis a vis the 
board of directors. In the present study, we build on their 
sociopolitical perspective on decoupling by considering how 
sources of experiential and vicarious learning could combine 
with internal political factors to influence decoupling of a cor- 
porate governance policy and how learning about decoupling 
in one policy arena through prior experience or network ties 
could influence the likelihood of decoupling in a different poli- 
cy arena. We test our theoretical framework in a context 
heretofore not studied in the organizational literature, namely, 
the implementation of stock repurchase plans by large U.S. 
corporations in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
A stock repurchase plan is a non-cash dividend distribution to 
stockholders that involves an adjustment of the firm's financ- 
ing mix, ownership structure, and asset composition (Franz, 
Rao, and Tripathy, 1995). A repurchase plan, often referred to 
as a buyback program, is a written policy approved by the 
board of directors (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). It is a formal 
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policy in the institutional sense, in that the elements and 
structure of the plan, as well as the procedure for adopting it, 
are relatively standardized across firms (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; Scott, 1992). The plan typically indicates the rationale 
for repurchasing shares and describes how repurchases will 
further corporate objectives. It also typically specifies the 
number of shares authorized for repurchase and indicates 
how the buybacks will be funded. Moreover, the plan is 
developed by corporate staff and presented to the board for 
approval, and segments of the plan are released to the press. 
Such policies have become quite popular among major U.S. 
corporations over the last fifteen years. During this period, 
institutional investors, other shareholder groups, and even 
regulatory groups increasingly voiced concern about the 
accountability of top managers to shareholders. These con- 
cerns manifested themselves as pressure for firms to adopt 
policies, such as repurchase programs, that demonstrate cor- 
porate control over managerial behavior on behalf of share- 
holder interests (Useem, 1993; Westphal and Zajac, 1994; 
Zajac and Westphal, 1995). Since 1987, U.S. firms announced 
plans to buy back over $1 trillion of their stocks, and buyback 
program adoptions averaged approximately 100 per month in 
the last two years (source: Securities Data Corporation). The 
phenomenon has shown no signs of waning, even during 
bullish periods in the stock market. A large empirical litera- 
ture in financial economics has examined stock market reac- 
tions to repurchase plan adoptions, with most published 
studies showing (on average) significantly positive and often 
very large and persistent market reactions to the adoption of 
these plans (cf. Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch, 1992; Medury, 
Bowyer, and Srinivasan, 1992; Raad and Wu, 1995; Ratner, 
Szewczyk, and Tsetsekos, 1996). In explaining these findings, 
financial economists have typically provided several related 
but distinct arguments. The first argument is that repurchase 
plan adoptions provide investors with positive information 
about the firm and its management. A firm's willingness to 
invest in itself by repurchasing a portion of its shares is seen 
as a declaration of its "bullishness" regarding its future. From 
this perspective, the adoption of repurchase plans indicates 
that management has encouraging information about the 
firm's future prospects, and the announcement essentially 
discloses the existence of this information (if not the specific 
content) to the market (Dann, 1981; Ratner, Szewczyk, and 
Tsetsekos, 1996). This perception is also shared in the busi- 
ness press, which typically notes with enthusiasm that "Wall 
Street . . . loves [buyback programs]" (Forbes, 1997), since 
they show that "we're standing by our shares, [and] that we 
hope that the individual and institutional community follows 
suit" (CNNfn, 1996), and even that buyback programs "can 
be signs of greatness" (Microsoft Investor Relations, 1997). 
A second argument is rooted more in agency theory and the 
free-cash-flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1989). Markets are seen 
as reacting favorably to repurchase plan adoptions because 
such plans effectively represent a distribution of cash to 
stockholders, when the alternative is to waste cash on 
empire-building projects or other perks that benefit managers 
more than owners (e.g., Bagwell and Shoven, 1988; Medury, 
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Bowyer, and Srinivasan, 1992). Thus, management's willing- 
ness to distribute free cash flow to shareholders by investing 
in the firm itself reveals that agency costs are under control 
and that the firm must be a good investment. This perspec- 
tive is found in the business press as well, whereby buy- 
backs are seen as "indicating that management cares about 
shareholders" (Wall Street Journal, 1997) and that good firms 
"use the tons of cash they throw off to accelerate earnings 
per-share growth rather than to blindly diversify through 
unnecessary acquisitions" (Microsoft Investor Relations, 
1997). Not surprisingly, active investors are seen as encour- 
aging or even demanding such actions, as reported in Forbes 
(1997): "'Many institutions push us to buy back stock,' says 
Kurt Landgrath, DuPont chief financial officer, 'especially 
since we have a strong balance sheet with $2 billion in 
cash."' 
An interesting feature of repurchase plans that is generally 
neglected in the financial economics literature, however, is 
that while they specify the number of shares targeted for 
repurchase, they do not specify exactly when the purchase 
will occur. In fact, as the media has reported, the adoption of 
a repurchase plan does not guarantee that it will be imple- 
mented: management can formally adopt a program to repur- 
chase a certain number of shares of the firm's common 
stock and then actually purchase only a small fraction of that 
amount or none at all (Wall Street Journal, 1996; Microsoft 
Investor Relations, 1997). Stock repurchase plans may there- 
fore be viewed as a formal policy that is partly or even largely 
symbolic in many cases, representing a possible decoupling 
of actual financial practices from formally stated plans (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981 b). The formal adoption of a 
repurchase plan may alleviate or avoid external pressure for 
other changes in organizational control (e.g., the replacement 
of top managers or increased board control over managers) 
that would threaten the discretion and autonomy of top man- 
agers even if the plan were not implemented. 
Some might question whether decoupling is a viable 
response to institutional pressures. For example, if the stock 
market typically "sees through" decoupling efforts, firms 
would lose any legitimacy benefits from having adopted the 
program. While a detailed discussion of financial markets is 
beyond the scope of this study, there are several reasons 
why decoupling can occur even when the stock market is the 
target of the decoupling effort. First, the only evidence on 
the market response to decoupling in the corporate gover- 
nance domain is provided by Westphal and Zajac (1998), who 
showed that positive stock market reactions from adopted 
governance policies can be sustained despite decoupling. 
Second, an important feature of financial equity markets is 
that even if investors were to anticipate the potential for 
decoupling, their response to a particular buyback program 
would depend on whether they thought that the rest of the 
market was skeptical as well. This assessment, in turn, is 
influenced by prior market responses to similar plans, which 
in this case tend to be persistently positive. This creates 
some potential for inertia in the market's evaluation of repur- 
chase plans over time, consistent with Jepperson's (1991 : 
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145) observation that institutional effects are maintained by a 
self-perpetuating social process. Third, during the period of 
our study, of the many finance studies examining how and 
why the market would react positively, on average, to stock 
buyback announcements, none offered theoretical or empiri- 
cal considerations of the possibility of decoupling. Since 
financial economic research did not address this issue, 
emphasizing, instead, the broadly positive features of buy- 
back announcements, there was little impetus for market 
participants to focus on the likelihood that buyback decou- 
pling might occur or to monitor implementation of adopted 
programs. Thus, decoupling can be viewed as a viable 
response to institutional pressures. Accordingly, the critical 
question becomes, why do many firms elect to implement 
their adopted repurchase plans while others decouple their 
plans from practice? 
THE DECOUPLING OF STOCK BUYBACK PROGRAMS 
CEO Power over the Board 
The decoupling of stock buyback plans and subsequent 
implementation may reflect efforts by organizational leaders 
to advance their political interests and/or preserve their 
power and influence over the organization. In general, decou- 
pling can relieve the tension created by the external pressure 
to change and the desire to avoid disruption to existing rela- 
tionships in the organization, including power relationships. 
Oliver (1991: 166) suggested that firms are more likely to 
avoid institutional pressures using tactics such as decoupling 
to the extent that external pressures for change are inconsis- 
tent with internal goals. When external constituents pressure 
firms to adopt a policy that threatens the discretion of organi- 
zational actors, those actors may favor a symbolic response 
that involves separating the substantive activities of the orga- 
nization from the formally adopted policy, thus enabling cor- 
porate leaders to preserve their discretion over the allocation 
of resources (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 1995: 128). As Edelman 
(1992) noted, organizations are often unwilling to incur costs 
to managerial control by implementing formally adopted 
plans. 
In the case of buyback programs, top managers may decou- 
ple actual financial investments from formally adopted repur- 
chase plans to preserve free cash flow for themselves and 
thus maintain managerial discretion over the allocation of cor- 
porate resources. Jensen (1986, 1989) suggested that man- 
agers seek to retain free cash flow in order to increase the 
size of the companies they run, which in turn leads to higher 
executive compensation, social prominence, and public pres- 
tige (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997). Several empirical 
studies have provided evidence that higher levels of free 
cash flow are associated with increases in executive com- 
pensation and greater perquisite consumption by top execu- 
tives, as well as acquisition decisions that appear to promote 
corporate stability at the expense of maximizing shareholder 
wealth (Lang, Stulz, and Walkling, 1991; Sawyer and 
Shrieves, 1994; Bathala, 1996). Conversely, when boards 
exercise more independent influence over top management, 
directors are more likely to exercise their monitoring and con- 
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trol function on behalf of shareholder interests by ensuring 
that repurchase programs are faithfully implemented. Empiri- 
cal research has shown that when boards exercise a relative- 
ly high degree of power as an independent governing body in 
the organization, they are more vigilant in overseeing man- 
agerial decision making in order to protect shareholder inter- 
ests (e.g., Kosnik, 1987; Wade, O'Reilly, and Chandratat, 
1990; Westphal and Zajac, 1994; Palmer et al., 1995). Thus, 
board influence may increase the likelihood of repurchase 
programs being substantive rather than symbolic. In effect, 
congruence between the goals of external constituents (i.e., 
institutional investors) and the goals of powerful actors in the 
organization (i.e., independent boards) increases the likeli- 
hood of acquiescence to external pressures (Oliver, 1991). 
When boards exercise more independent influence over 
financial policy, CEOs may be less able to decouple actual 
investment practices from formally adopted plans, as repur- 
chase programs come to represent a substantive commit- 
ment to the firm and its shareholders (i.e., by actually invest- 
ing in the firm). Moreover, independent boards are more 
likely to distribute free cash flow to investors, preventing top 
managers from reserving funds for diversification, higher 
perquisites, or other actions that do not advance shareholder 
objectives. 
In proposing that relative CEO power over the board can help 
determine whether firms decouple repurchase plans from 
practice, our theoretical argument suggests that powerful 
actors mediate institutional effects. This view is consistent 
with emerging perspectives in the neo-institutional literature, 
as several theorists have begun to emphasize the potential 
role of individual volition in mediating institutional effects. In 
drawing from Meyer and Rowan's (1977) classic argument, 
Scott (1987: 498) has suggested that organizations and their 
leaders "do not necessarily conform to [external pressures to 
adopt policies or structures] because they are taken-for-grant- 
ed, but often because they are rewarded for doing so." 
Moreover, Oliver (1991: 149) noted that "institutional theory 
can accommodate interest-seeking, active behavior" in 
explaining responses to institutional pressures and expecta- 
tions. Westphal and Zajac (1994) and Zajac and Westphal 
(1995) proposed and found evidence consistent with the idea 
that powerful corporate actors can stimulate, as well as be 
influenced by, the development of institutional processes 
such as decoupling and the use of socially appropriate corpo- 
rate language. Our theoretical argument builds on their sym- 
bolic management perspective in proposing that political dif- 
ferences can help explain differences in how organizations 
respond to environmental pressures for managerial account- 
ability. Specifically, our theoretical argument regarding the 
effect of CEO power over the board on the symbolic vs. sub- 
stantive nature of stock repurchase programs suggests the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 (Hi): The greater the CEO's power over the board, 
the greater the firm's decoupling of its buyback program from prac- 
tice (i.e., the lower the extent of implementation). 
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Interlock Ties and Vicarious Learning 
External, social structural factors may provide additional 
insight into explaining institutional decoupling. From an 
embeddedness perspective, economic action is socially situ- 
ated and cannot be explained by reference to individual politi- 
cal motives alone (Granovetter, 1985; Oliver, 1996). Similarly, 
macro-institutional pressures alone do not determine organi- 
zational action but are mediated by the organization's immedi- 
ate social structural context, as determined by social network 
ties. Thus, in responding to external pressures for greater 
corporate accountability to shareholders, top managers and 
directors are influenced by information obtained from their 
network ties to leaders of other firms. 
An important indicator of social network ties between leaders 
of large firms is the network of overlapping board member- 
ships. A growing body of empirical research has examined 
the consequences of overlapping board ties for organizational 
behavior (see Mizruchi, 1996). Studies in this paradigm have 
viewed board interlock ties as a mechanism for resolving 
uncertainty about the implications of adopting organizational 
practices, programs, or other structures (e.g., Galaskiewicz 
and Wasserman, 1989; Davis, 1991; Mizruchi, 1992; 
Haunschild, 1993; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993; 
Haunschild and Miner, 1997). In discussing how interlock ties 
to prior adopters may increase the likelihood of adopting 
takeover defenses, for example, Davis (1 991) emphasized 
the value of direct communication between managers and 
directors in raising awareness about the potential benefits of 
adoption and how to avoid the potential drawbacks from 
adoption, thus providing a mechanism for vicarious learning. 
Although prior studies have not directly considered the influ- 
ence of interorganizational network ties on how and to what 
extent formally adopted policies are actually implemented, it 
seems reasonable to expect that the decoupling of a formally 
adopted policy would be facilitated by network ties to firms 
that previously engaged in decoupling. In particular, interlock 
ties to firms that engaged in symbolic decoupling of repur- 
chase plans can raise awareness about the symbolic and 
political benefits of decoupling governance policies from prac- 
tice, such that network ties can provide a mechanism for vic- 
arious learning about symbolic action in response to institu- 
tional pressures. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): The extent of decoupling of stock buyback 
programs from practice at other firms to which the focal firm is con- 
nected by an interlock tie will increase the firm's decoupling of its 
buyback program. 
In addition, our theoretical perspective suggests that the rela- 
tive influence of interlock ties on corporate action depends 
on whether those ties provide information that can further 
the interests of powerful actors in the firm. As discussed ear- 
lier, powerful top managers are likely to prefer symbolic buy- 
back programs, which enable them to preserve their discre- 
tion over corporate resources, and having ties to firms that 
have decoupled their buyback programs from practice can 
raise top managers' awareness about the potential to engage 
in symbolic action. Thus, our framework suggests that while 
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a CEO's power over the board can be an important predictor 
of the extent of institutional decoupling, the effect of intraor- 
ganizational political interests may be further amplified by 
external network relations that provide a vehicle for vicarious 
learning by raising awareness about the potential for symbol- 
ic decoupling: 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): The vicarious learning relationship hypothe- 
sized in H2a will be greater for firms whose CEOs are powerful rela- 
tive to the board. 
Vicarious learning may also take place as a result of the diffu- 
sion of symbolic decoupling across different but related poli- 
cy domains through social network ties. In terms of the cur- 
rent study, network ties to other companies that have 
successfully adopted and decoupled a particular corporate 
governance policy that purports to reduce agency costs may 
increase the likelihood that the focal firm will adopt and 
decouple other policies that have similar stated objectives. 
For example, Westphal and Zajac (1994) showed that from 
the late 1970s to mid-1980s many firms responded to exter- 
nal pressures for increased managerial accountability by 
adopting long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) for top managers 
that purported to align executive compensation with share- 
holder interests but did not actually implement the plans (i.e., 
they made no grants under the formally adopted plans). By 
decoupling the plans from practice, top managers were able 
to avoid higher compensation risk in their pay packages. 
Thus, having network ties to firms that have previously 
adopted and decoupled LTIPs from practice may increase the 
likelihood that executives will recognize the potential to 
decouple stock repurchase plans, such that vicarious learning 
through network ties can extend across related policy 
domains. Corporate actors who have witnessed or participat- 
ed in the decoupling of LTIPs on other boards are more likely 
to conceive governance policies with a similar agency ratio- 
nale, such as stock repurchase plans, as symbolic acts, thus 
increasing the likelihood of decoupling: 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): The extent of decoupling of CEO incentive 
plans (LTIPs) from practice at other firms to which the focal firm is 
connected by an interlock tie will increase the firm's decoupling of 
its buyback program. 
Moreover, vicarious experience with decoupling LTIPs from 
practice through interlock ties should have a greater effect on 
decoupling of repurchase plans from practice when CEOs are 
relatively powerful. Interlock ties to firms that have decou- 
pled LTIPs from practice in the past can raise CEOs' aware- 
ness and appreciation of the potential for symbolic gover- 
nance policies to enhance the legitimacy of the firm's 
leadership without interfering with managerial control over 
the allocation of resources. This suggests the following, addi- 
tional hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): The vicarious learning relationship hypothe- 
sized in H3a will be greater for firms whose CEOs are powerful rela- 
tive to the board. 
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Prior Decoupling and Experiential Learning 
While network ties provide one opportunity for managers to 
become aware of the potential for symbolic decoupling, there 
may also be a more direct form of learning that increases the 
likelihood of observing a stock buyback program decoupled 
from practice: a firm's prior experience with decoupling for- 
mal adoption of a program from practice may affect the prob- 
ability of future decoupling. Given the dearth of research on 
decoupling and its antecedents, it is perhaps not surprising 
that there is virtually no discussion of decoupling as a repeat- 
ed practice. Westphal and Zajac (1998) have speculated, 
however, that firms may engage in symbolic management 
repeatedly across multiple domains or issues. A central tenet 
of the organizational learning literature is that actions associ- 
ated with positive outcomes are more likely to be repeated, 
even after only one instance of the behavior (Cyert and 
March, 1963; Huber, 1991; March, Sproull, and Tamuz, 1991). 
Westphal and Zajac (1998) found strong evidence that firms 
experienced positive stock market reactions to incentive 
plans that were adopted and decoupled from actual incentive 
arrangements, as well as to plans that were actually imple- 
mented, and there is also evidence that firms enjoy positive 
market reactions to decoupled buyback programs (Zajac and 
Westphal, 2001). Based on such positive reinforcement, 
experience with decoupling is likely to be encoded into orga- 
nizational memory and routines and thus be invoked in the 
process of adopting other governance policies in the future. 
Moreover, our overall theoretical perspective suggests that 
the influence of prior instances of decoupling, which height- 
ens awareness of decoupling as an option, is likely to be 
moderated by power in the CEO/board relationship. In effect, 
a firm's prior direct experience with symbolic decoupling 
serves as a precedent that reduces uncertainty among top 
managers about the potential for symbolic action to further 
their political interests. Thus, while prior experience with 
decoupling is likely to be encoded into organizational memory 
and routines, corporate leaders have a selective memory and 
are particularly likely to draw on prior experience with decou- 
pling when it serves their political interests. Such "selective 
learning" from experience (Ocasio, 1999: 388) dovetails with 
recent theoretical developments on organizational routines 
and learning, which suggest that reliance on routines that 
have been developed from experience is contingent on the 
political interests and identities of powerful actors or groups 
in the organization (March and Olsen, 1989; March, Schultz, 
and Zhou, 2000). This suggests the following, additional 
hypotheses, which parallel H2a-H3b: 
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): Prior decoupling of stock buyback programs 
from practice will increase a firm's decoupling of its current buyback 
program. 
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): The experiential learning relationship hypoth- 
esized in H4a will be greater for firms whose CEOs are powerful rel- 
ative to the board. 
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Westphal (1998) showed that increases in 
structural sources of board power, includ- 
ing separation of the CEO and board chair 
positions, can prompt political behavior by 
the CEO that paradoxically reduces the 
board's overall power over decision mak- 
ing. This occurred only for changes in 
board structure, however (e.g., separating 
the CEO and board chair positions when 
they were previously combined); in this 
study, we examine indicators of the level 
of board power. 
Decoupling 
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): Prior decoupling of CEO incentive plans 
(LTIPs) from practice will increase a firm's decoupling of its buyback 
program. 
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): The experiential learning relationship hypoth- 
esized in H5a will be greater for firms whose CEOs are powerful rel- 
ative to the board. 
METHOD 
Sample and Data 
The sample for this study was drawn from the population of 
large and medium-sized U.S. industrial and service firms list- 
ed in the 1985 Forbes and Fortune 500 indexes. The final 
sample included all companies for which complete data were 
available on board structure, ownership, stock repurchases, 
financial and operating characteristics. This criterion yielded 
412 companies. We examined whether firms in this sample 
were significantly different in size (sales) or performance 
(market-to-book value and stock market returns) from compa- 
nies in the larger population. Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sam- 
ple tests revealed no significant differences on any of these 
measures. 
Complete data were collected for the period 1985 to 1991. 
We also collected earlier and later data to measure interlock 
ties to prior adopters and subsequent implementation by the 
focal firm and to develop lagged measures of the other inde- 
pendent variables. We chose to examine repurchase adop- 
tions from 1985 to 1991 because a wave of adoptions 
occurred during this period (Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch, 
1992). Between September 1986 and December 1990, firms 
in our sample adopted 544 repurchase plans; during the pre- 
vious five-year period, they had adopted only 148. We 
obtained data on repurchase plan adoption and implementa- 
tion from an extensive database compiled by the Securities 
Data Company. We further developed this database, which 
has been described as "the most complete source of infor- 
mation" regarding stock repurchase programs (Fried, 1998: 
22) to reduce missing data and checked the accuracy of 
these data using the Wall Street Journal Index, Reuters, and 
the Investment Dealers' Digest. 
We obtained data on board structure, interlocks, and owner- 
ship from Compact Disclosure, Standard & Poor's Register of 
Corporations, Directors, and Executives, and corporate proxy 
statements. Data on financial and operating characteristics 
were obtained from COMPUSTAT. Data on CEO incentive 
plan adoption and implementation were also obtained from 
corporate proxy statements. 
Independent and Dependent Variables 
The primary dependent variable in this study is the extent of 
repurchase plan implementation, calculated as the number of 
shares repurchased in a given year divided by the total num- 
ber of shares available for repurchase in that year under the 
plan. 
CEO power over the board. We used four different mea- 
sures of the CEO's power relative to the board.1 The first is 
the CEO's tenure relative to the average tenure of board 
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2 
We also conducted a separate analysis in 
which the dichotomous measure of board 
leadership was excluded from the index 
and entered as a separate variable. The 
results presented below were substan- 
tively unchanged. 
members. Several studies have hypothesized that longer 
tenure relative to the average tenure of board members 
should enhance the CEO's power vis-a-vis the board (e.g., 
Singh and Harianto, 1989; Wade, O'Reilly, and Chandratat, 
1990). High relative tenure confers expert power through a 
greater familiarity with the organization's distinctive compe- 
tencies and methods of operation (Zald, 1969). CEOs may 
also acquire greater social status within the organization over 
time, as they develop their internal and external social net- 
work (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Pfeffer, 1981a). Con- 
versely, widely held behavioral norms on corporate boards 
may induce new directors to defer to more experienced top 
managers in board meetings (Alderfer, 1986). Finally, a CEO's 
high relative tenure may index cooptation of the board, as 
CEOs typically determine the selection of new directors 
(Mace, 1971). 
Our second measure of CEO power over the board is the 
portion of the board appointed after the CEO. In effect, this 
measure is a relatively direct indicator of board cooptation. 
Outside appointments confer prestige and status, as well as 
financial rewards and perquisites (Wade, O'Reilly, and Chan- 
dratat, 1 990). Thus, as several authors have suggested, 
norms of reciprocity should lead outside board members to 
feel socially obligated to support the CEO who was responsi- 
ble for nominating them to the board and/or approving their 
appointment (Boeker, 1992; Daily and Dalton, 1995; Wade, 
O'Reilly, and Chandratat, 1990). Some research has shown 
that boards comprising largely CEO appointments permit 
more generous CEO compensation packages (Main, O'Reilly, 
and Wade, 1995) and that firms were more likely to adopt 
certain anti-takeover provisions where a relatively large por- 
tion of the board was appointed after the CEO (Sundara- 
murthy, 1996). 
Our third measure of relative CEO/board power is board lead- 
ership structure. Corporate governance researchers have typ- 
ically argued that a CEO's joint possession of the CEO and 
board chair positions reduces board independence from man- 
agement and enables top managers to quash dissent on the 
board if it threatens their interests (Rechner and Dalton, 
1991). Several studies have provided evidence that separa- 
tion of the CEO and board chair positions can enhance the 
tendency for the board's decision making to protect share- 
holder interests (e.g., Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Westphal 
and Zajac, 1 994). Finally, our fourth measure is director stock 
ownership, which can provide an important source of influ- 
ence. Voting rights afford greater power to owner-directors, 
and higher levels of director stock ownership should increase 
the tendency for board involvement to reflect shareholder 
interests (Zald, 1969; Kosnik, 1987; Bergh, 1995). We com- 
bine the four measures into a single index of CEO power 
over the board using principal components analysis (Jackson, 
1991). As a data reduction technique, principal components is 
appropriately applied to causal (vs. reflective) indicators (Mac- 
Callum and Browne, 1993). Although causal indicators need 
not be intercorrelated, a separate factor analysis confirmed 
that all four indicators loaded on a single factor, with an 
eigenvalue greater than one.2 
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Interlock ties. A second set of independent variables 
assessed the extent of decoupling at other companies to 
which the focal firm was connected by an interlock tie. In 
developing this measure, we distinguished between and 
measured both one-step ties (direct links) and two-step ties 
(i.e., ties through a common third party). Most recent studies 
on interlock ties have focused on one-step ties, which 
include both "directional interlocks" (i.e., ties created by indi- 
viduals who are owners or officers of one of the two firms) 
and "non-directional interlocks" (i.e., ties created as a result 
of individuals serving as outside directors at both firms) (e.g., 
Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1993; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 
1993). Although directional interlocks may constitute a 
stronger tie between firms (cf. Haunschild, 1993; Palmer et 
al., 1995), non-directional interlocks can also clearly provide a 
conduit for the exchange of information, as outside directors 
draw on their experience at other boards in contributing to 
decision making at the focal board. Thus, we included both 
kinds of interlocks and distinguished between them in mea- 
suring one-step ties to other firms that had adopted repur- 
chase plans or LTIPs; we did not distinguish between direc- 
tional and non-directional two-step ties. Moreover, we 
included all ties to prior adopters in the larger sample frame 
for which data were available (i.e., including firms that were 
excluded from the analyses because data for one or more of 
the other measures were unavailable). 
To test H2a, which predicts that decoupling of buyback pro- 
grams at tied-to firms will interact with CEO power over the 
board to increase decoupling at the focal firm, we measured 
the extent of decoupling at tied-to firms as 
N 
(1 - Pi) 
N 
where Pi is the percentage of shares repurchased at tied-to 
firm i, and N is the number of tied-to firms that adopted a 
repurchase plan within the past five years. An analogous vari- 
able was created to measure the extent of decoupling of 
LTIPs at tied-to firms (decoupling of LTIPs at tied-to firms). 
Although LTIPs were adopted between the early 1970s and 
the early 1 990s, ostensibly to improve the relationship 
between CEO pay and firm performance, Westphal and Zajac 
(1994, 1998) documented that a large portion of these plans 
(54 percent) were not actually implemented (i.e., no shares 
were granted under the plan). We analyzed proxies in detail 
throughout the diffusion period to confirm the newness of 
coded LTIP adoptions and to accurately record the number of 
shares granted under the plans (see Westphal and Zajac, 
1994). For this measure, Pi is the percentage of shares 
reserved for issuance under the LTIP that were actually grant- 
ed under the plan, and N is the number of tied-to firms that 
adopted a plan. 
We also measured two-step ties to prior adopters. Mizruchi 
(1992) found that two-step board ties were particularly strong 
predictors of firm behavior. In particular, the number of ties 
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that firms shared with the same financial institutions was a 
consistently strong predictor of similarity in political behavior 
between firms. This finding is consistent with the view that 
boards of financial institutions provide a clearinghouse for 
information on the latest business practices adopted by other 
companies, so that firms with mutual ties to the same finan- 
cial institutions are more likely to have exchanged informa- 
tion about policy decisions in their respective firms, while 
also gaining access to similar information about practices at 
other firms (Useem, 1984; Palmer, Friedland, and Singh, 
1986; Mizruchi, 1992). Moreover, to the extent that firms in 
structurally equivalent positions are more likely to imitate one 
another (Burt, 1987), firms may tend to imitate the policies of 
other organizations in similar structural positions. Common 
ties to financial institutions may be especially potent in fos- 
tering imitation. Mizruchi noted that such ties may lead firms 
to imitate one another as they compete for capital from the 
same institutions. Thus, we also created measures indicating 
the extent of decoupling among firms that are connected by 
two-step ties to the focal firm through the board of a financial 
institution: decoupling of buyback programs at tied-to firms 
(two-step ties) and decoupling of LTIPs at tied-to firms (two- 
step ties). 
We tested the hypothesized interaction effects using the 
product-term approach. To avoid any possible multicollinearity 
problem, the relevant variables were centered (Jaccard, Tur- 
risi, and Wan, 1990). Although at least one study has sug- 
gested that this transformation is unnecessary (Harrison and 
Mitchell, 1995), there is not yet a consensus on this issue. 
Thus, it seemed appropriate to use this procedure because, 
at worst, it has no effect on the results, and, at best, it helps 
avoid multicollinearity. 
Prior experience. We created two independent variables to 
indicate prior experience with decoupling. These measures 
parallel the indicators of decoupling at tied-to firms discussed 
above. The first variable, prior decoupling of buyback pro- 
grams, was calculated by taking the average percentage of 
shares repurchased under plans that were adopted during 
the previous ten years (i.e., prior to the current plan) and sub- 
tracting this value from one; thus, higher values indicate 
greater decoupling. Similarly, we calculated prior decoupling 
of LTIPs by taking the percentage of shares reserved for 
issuance under a previously adopted LTIP that were actually 
granted under the plan and subtracting this value from one. 
Control Variables 
In the interest of thoroughness, we controlled for factors that 
have been shown to influence repurchase plan adoption in 
models of implementation. Existing research in financial eco- 
nomics on repurchase plans has focused more on the conse- 
quences (i.e., stock market reactions) than on the 
antecedents of adoption. The few studies that have 
addressed this issue have emphasized financial characteris- 
tics. Some finance studies have argued that low cash flow 
could constrain the firm's ability to make repurchases (Nor- 
gaard and Norgaard, 1974; Bagwell and Shoven, 1988; 
Medury, Bowyer, and Srinivasan, 1992). Others have con- 
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tended that higher cash flow might raise concerns about 
agency problems in the firm (Jensen, 1989; Davis and Stout, 
1992; Palmer et al., 1995; Lie, 2000), thus influencing the 
potential benefits from repurchase plan implementation. 
Thus, we controlled for cash flow per share in the analyses 
(i.e., income before extraordinary items, divided by total com- 
mon shares). We also controlled for the quick ratio as a mea- 
sure of liquidity. Although the evidence is mixed, some prior 
research has shown that liquidity is associated with repur- 
chase plan adoption (Young, 1969; Medury, Bowyer, and 
Srinivasan, 1992). The quick ratio is calculated as total receiv- 
ables plus cash and all securities readily transferable into 
cash, divided by total current liabilities. 
Some research has also shown a relationship between finan- 
cial leverage and repurchase plan adoptions, although the 
direction of causality in these studies is somewhat uncertain 
(Norgaard and Norgaard, 1974; Medury, Bowyer, and Srini- 
vasan, 1992). As a measure of firm indebtedness, therefore, 
we included the ratio of long-term debt to equity. Moreover, 
given some evidence for an association between firm size 
and repurchases (Medury, Bowyer, and Srinivasan, 1992), we 
controlled for the log of firm sales in the analyses. In addi- 
tion, we controlled for firm performance (total stock returns 
and market-to-book value), as poor performance could 
increase shareholder demands for repurchases. Total stock 
returns was defined as capital gains plus dividends accrued 
during the year, divided by share price at the beginning of the 
year. Market-to-book gauges a firm's effectiveness in creating 
value for shareholders by comparing a firm's market value 
with the cost of capital contributed by shareholders (Varaiya, 
Kerin, and Weeks, 1987). 
We controlled for CEO stock ownership in all models, calcu- 
lated as a percentage of total common equity, given that 
CEOs who hold significant amounts of stock may have more 
personal incentive to make stock repurchases. Moreover, 
large institutional investors may be more likely than other 
shareholders to scrutinize the implementation of stock repur- 
chase plans, although evidence that institutional owners have 
a substantive impact on corporate governance is mixed 
(Useem, 1993; Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley, 1994; Westphal 
and Zajac, 1998). Thus, we controlled for institutional owner- 
ship, measured as the total number of shares held by pen- 
sion funds, banks and trust companies, savings and loans, 
mutual fund managers, and labor union funds, divided by 
total common stock (Hill and Hansen, 1991). 
In addition, we also controlled for board centrality in the net- 
work of interlocking directorates, measured as the natural log 
of the total number of non-duplicated ties between the focal 
board and all other boards in the larger sample (Davis, 1991; 
Haunschild, 1993). Interlock centrality is thought to provide 
social capital that can perpetuate the control of corporate 
leaders (Davis and Stout, 1992; Palmer et al., 1995). Thus, 
centrality could reduce the perceived need to make stock 
repurchases. Finally, we also controlled for possible industry 
differences in the stock repurchase activity by including 
dummy variables for the two-digit Standard Industry Classifi- 
cation codes in the sample, but given the number of different 
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Given that high-technology companies 
sometimes make repurchases to offset 
large stock option grants, we conducted 
separate analyses that included a control 
variable for the number of stock options 
outstanding (calculated as a percent of 
total common equity) for those years in 
which data were available. The hypothe- 
sized results were substantively 
unchanged. Moreover, differences in the 
motivation for repurchase programs at 
companies in the high-technology indus- 
try vs. other industries are captured by 
the industry control variables. The results 
were also robust to the inclusion of year 
dummy variables. 
industries represented in the sample, coefficients for these 
variables are not reported. All control variables were mea- 
sured in the prior year (yeart ).3 To address the possibility 
that our independent variables could change during the 
implementation window (e.g., power changes resulting from 
CEO succession or changes in free cash flow or stock perfor- 
mance) and thus affect implementation, our independent vari- 
ables of theoretical interest and the control variables were 
updated annually in the analyses. 
Analysis 
We estimated the decoupling of stock buyback programs 
using the Heckman selection model, a two-stage procedure 
that corrects for sample selection bias in regression analysis 
(Heckman and Borjas, 1980). Given that the hypothesized 
effects on decoupling are limited to firms that have adopted 
a repurchase plan, sample selection bias could threaten the 
generalizability of our results to the larger population of For- 
tune/Forbes 500 firms: if companies that adopt repurchase 
plans tend to have more powerful CEOs or more board ties 
to firms that have decoupled repurchase plans, then OLS 
results may not generalize to the larger population. 
The Heckman model includes two equations: the first (selec- 
tion) equation estimates the likelihood of adoption with an 
event history model for the full sample, and the hazard rate 
from that model is then included in a second-stage regres- 
sion model to estimate the degree of implementation (i.e., 
among the reduced sample of firms that have adopted a 
plan). Thus, parameter estimates from the event history 
model, which are based on information from all firm-years in 
the sample, are included in the second-stage models. In the 
selection model, we treated repurchase plan adoption as a 
repeatable event (i.e., firms were at risk of adoption through- 
out the time period). We followed Allison's (1984) suggested 
approach to repeated-event models by including two addition- 
al control variables that tap each firm's prior event history: (1) 
the length of the prior interval between adoptions, measured 
in days, and (2) the number of adoptions during the prior ten- 
year period (see also Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988). The data 
were arranged by firm-year and updated annually. CEO power 
over the board and all control variables were lagged by one 
year. Sixty-eight cases were right-truncated due to mergers, 
takeovers, or acquisitions during the risk period, leaving a 
sample of 2,652 firm-years. 
In the second-stage model of repurchase activity, repurchas- 
es are observed separately for each year in the implementa- 
tion window following repurchase plan adoption (i.e., five 
observations per case of adoption). Thus, we applied pooled 
cross-sectional time series regression (Greene, 1993) to esti- 
mate repurchase activity. To correct for heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelated error terms, we used the generalized 
least squares (GLS) estimator. The independent variables 
were updated in each year. Accordingly, this modeling 
approach predicts repurchases based on relative CEO/board 
power, interlocks, and other variables in the prior year. In sep- 
arate models, we estimated implementation over shorter 
time periods (e.g., two or three years), and the results pre- 
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sented below were substantively robust to these different 
implementation windows. 
Finally, some have argued that tender offers are occasionally 
used to avoid hostile takeovers, and such plans may not be 
well received by external stakeholders (cf. Bagnoli, Gordon, 
and Lipman, 1989; Davidson and Garrison, 1989). Thus, even 
though tender offers represent only a small portion of all 
repurchase plans adopted during the period of study (13 per- 
cent), and only certain kinds of tender offers (i.e., Dutch auc- 
tions) are suitable as takeover deterrents (Persons, 1994), we 
conducted separate analyses in which these few repurchase 
plans were excluded from the sample, and the results pre- 
sented below were substantively unchanged. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations are displayed 
in table 1. Table 2 shows the results of Heckman selection 
models of repurchase plan implementation. The first column 
of table 2 (model 1) includes the main effects model. The 
estimates for this model support HI. In particular, the CEO's 
power over the board is negatively related to the extent of 
repurchase plan implementation during the five-year period 
following adoption. H2a predicted that the extent of decou- 
pling of stock buyback programs at other firms to which the 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N = 2,652) 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. CEO power over the board .00 1.06 
2. Decoupling of buyback programs 
at tied-to firms (one-step ties) .59 .32 .06 
3. Decoupling of buyback programs 
at tied-to firms (two-step ties) .61 .30 .02 .10 
4. Decoupling of LTIPs 
at tied-to firms (one-step ties) .54 .35 .03 .07 .04 
5. Decoupling of LTIPs 
at tied-to firms (two-step ties) .55 .32 .01 .05 .11 .08 
6. Prior decoupling of buyback programs .57 .39 .02 .03 .01 -.01 .00 
7. Prior decoupling of LTIPs .52 .42 .04 .01 -.02 .04 .01 .04 
8. Total stock market returns .08 .31 -.10 -.01 .05 .01 .00 .02 .05 
9. Market-to-book value 1.54 1.22 -.05 .12 .11 -.01 -.02 .03 .03 .17 
10. Cash flow per share 2.58 2.87 .00 .18 .02 -.03 .02 .02 -.01 -.06 
11. Quick ratio 1.24 1.88 .03 .05 .06 .02 .01 .04 .02 -.02 
12. Long-term debt to equity .70 1.12 .16 -.01 -.09 .01 .04 .01 -.01 -.01 
13. Log of firm sales 8.02 1.06 .12 .01 .06 .04 .08 .05 .10 .03 
14. Institutional ownership .32 .21 -.04 .04 .00 .02 .06 -.03 -.01 .04 
15. CEO ownership .04 .03 .18 .02 .04 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.13 .04 
16. Board centrality 1.95 .87 .07 .14 .09 .06 .05 .06 .10 .04 
17. Repurchase plan implementation* .09 .15 -.22 -.36 -.19 -.29 -.13 -.12 -.24 .06 
Variable 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
10. Cash flow per share .16 
11. Quick ratio .17 -.22 
12. Long-term debt to equity -.24 -.32 -.17 
13. Log of firm sales -.03 .38 -.09 .01 
14. Institutional ownership .23 .16 .10 -.21 .09 
15. CEO ownership .02 .06 .04 -.07 -.15 -.14 
16. Board centrality .10 -.02 .01 -.04 .09 .23 .05 
17. Repurchase plan implementation* .04 -.08 -.09 .11 -.13 -.14 -.03 .12 
* Statistics for this variable are calculated for the sample of firm-years in which a repurchase plan is outstanding (N - 
2,720). 
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focal firm is connected by an interlock tie would increase the 
focal firm's decoupling of its buyback program. Model 1 in 
table 2 also shows evidence supporting this hypothesis, both 
for one-step and two-step ties. H2b predicted that the extent 
of decoupling of stock buyback programs at other firms to 
which the focal firm is connected by an interlock tie would 
interact with CEO power over the board to increase the focal 
firm's decoupling of its buyback program. The results shown 
in models 2 and 4 support this hypothesis, and the interac- 
tion is significant for both one-step and two-step ties. 
H3a predicted that the extent of decoupling of LTIPs at tied- 
to firms would increase the focal firm's decoupling of its buy- 
Table 2 
Heckman Selection Models of Repurchase Plan Implementation* 
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CEO power over the board -.004.. -.004. -.004. -.004" 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Decoupling of buyback programs at tied-to firms (one-step ties) -.020"" -.022"" -.020"w -.022w" 
(.007) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
Decoupling of buyback programs at tied-to firms (two-step ties) -.01 6` -.0190 -.015* -.021l 
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.009) 
Decoupling of LTIPs at tied-to firms (one-step ties) -.01 8* -.021 -.019w -.022w 
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.008) 
Decoupling of LTIPs at tied-to firms (two-step ties) -.007 -.007 -.006 -.007 
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
Prior decoupling of buyback programs -.008 -.010-- -.008 -.008 
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Prior decoupling of LTIPs -.0100 -.011 Af -.010 -.0100 
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Decoupling of buyback programs at tied-to firms (one-step ties) x -.013* -.01 2* 
CEO power over the board (.006) (.006) 
Decoupling of buyback programs at tied-to firms (two-step ties) x -.01 8* -.01 6o 
CEO power over the board (.006) (.006) 
Decoupling of LTIPs at tied-to firms (one-step ties) x -.01 5 -.01 56 
CEO power over the board (.006) (.006) 
Decoupling of LTIPs at tied-to firms (two-step ties) x -.004 -.001 
CEO power over the board (.006) (.007) 
Prior decoupling of buyback prog. x CEO power over the board -.0090 -.0100 
(.005) (.005) 
Prior decoupling of LTIPs x CEO power over the board -.010w -.011 Age 
(.003) (.004) 
Total stock market returns .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Market-to-book value .002 .002 .002 .002 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Cash flow per share -.002* -.002* -.002* -.002" 
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Quick ratio -.002 -.002 -.002 -.001 
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Long-term debt to equity .0006w .0006m .0005w* .0004" 
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) 
Log of firm sales -.005" -.004* -.003 -.002 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Institutional ownership -.018* -.017* -.015 -.010 
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.009) 
CEO ownership -.022 -.019 -.021 -.019 
(.054) (.054) (.053) (.055) 
Board centrality .004 .005* .005* .005" 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Constant .117 .111 .130 .141 
(.073) (.072) (.073) (.074) 
Chi-square 121.49*0w 139.26*0w 132.78w0* 144.81 
p < .10; * p < .05; *0 p < .01; p < .001; significance levels are one-tailed for hypothesized effects. 
* Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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In separate analyses, we estimated a sep- 
arate model for each interaction term. 
Each interaction that was significant in 
model 4 of table 2 remained significant in 
these models. 
Decoupling 
back program. As model 1 shows, this hypothesis is support- 
ed for one-step ties but not two-step ties. H3b posited that 
the relationship predicted in H3a would be stronger for firms 
with greater CEO power over the board. Models 2 and 4 
show that this hypothesis is also supported for one-step ties 
but not two-step ties. 
The results thus show that the extent of decoupling of buy- 
back programs at tied-to firms has a positive effect on the 
extent of buyback decoupling at the focal firm, for both one- 
step and two-step ties. Similarly, the extent of LTIP decou- 
pling at firms that are connected to the focal firm by a one- 
step interlock tie has a positive effect on the extent of 
decoupling of buyback programs at the focal firm. These 
effects also hold up in models 2 through 4, indicating that for 
three of the four network variables, the extent of decoupling 
at tied-to firms has a positive effect on decoupling at the 
focal firm at average levels of CEO power over the board. 
The interaction effects suggest that these network effects 
are amplified further when CEOs are particularly powerful rel- 
ative to the board. 
H4a posited that a firm's prior decoupling of buyback pro- 
grams would increase decoupling of the focal buyback pro- 
gram. These results are weaker, with only model 2 showing a 
significant main effect of prior decoupling of buyback pro- 
grams. H4b predicted that a firm's prior decoupling of buy- 
back programs would interact with CEO power over the 
board to increase decoupling of the focal buyback program. 
This hypothesis is supported, as shown in models 3 and 4: 
CEO power over the board amplifies the effect of prior 
decoupling of stock buyback programs on decoupling in the 
current year. 
The results also support H5a, with all models showing that 
prior decoupling of LTIPs has a significant main effect on sub- 
sequent decoupling of buyback programs at the focal firm in 
the current year. Finally, the results in models 3 and 4 sup- 
port H5b: the effect of previously decoupled LTIPs on stock 
buyback decoupling becomes significantly more positive for 
firms whose CEOs have greater power over the board. The 
interaction effects again suggest that the effects of prior 
decoupling experience are amplified further when CEOs are 
particularly powerful relative to the board. Accordingly, the 
pattern of results for prior decoupling experience parallels the 
network effects discussed above.4 
It might be suggested that prior decoupling experience repre- 
sents another indicator of CEO power, so that the effect of 
such experience on decoupling is entirely due to CEO power 
over the board. But prior decoupling experience is not signifi- 
cantly correlated with current CEO power over the board, as 
shown in table 1 (r = .02 and .04 for prior decoupling of buy- 
backs and LTIPs, respectively). The different dimensions of 
the measure of CEO power that we use in the study have 
been verified in past studies as valid indicators of this con- 
struct (Boyd, 1994); thus, to the extent that our measure of 
power is valid, prior experience with decoupling cannot be 
considered an indicator of current CEO power over the board. 
The reason for the low correlation between prior decoupling 
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and current CEO power is that changes in board membership 
and/or CEO succession in the interim between adoptions 
lead to changes in CEO power over the board. Thus, previous 
decoupling events do not, on average, serve as reliable indi- 
cators of CEO power at the time of subsequent decoupling 
events. 
In summary, the results show that there is variation in the 
extent of institutional decoupling among the organizations 
studied and that (1) intraorganizational political factors predict 
strongly the extent of this institutional decoupling, (2) greater 
awareness of the potential for decoupling, as indicated by 
social ties to prior "decouplers," as well as an organization's 
own prior experience with decoupling (within and across poli- 
cy domains), also predict decoupling, and (3) these political 
interests and social awareness factors interact to add greater 
explanatory power when predicting institutional decoupling. 
DISCUSSION 
We began by noting that despite the importance of the con- 
cept of institutional decoupling, there is very little theoretical 
or empirical research that seeks to explain when and where 
it is more or less likely to be observed. In addition, despite 
the fact that U.S. firms continue to adopt plans to buy back 
hundreds of billions of dollars worth of stock each year 
(according to Securities Data Company), the phenomenon of 
stock repurchase programs has also not been examined in 
the organizational iterature. Our study has attempted to add 
to our understanding of both issues. The results strongly sug- 
gest that decoupling is both a common and a predictable 
occurrence in the domain of stock buyback programs. We 
found that decoupling occurs in a significant portion of buy- 
back adoptions and that our sociopolitical framework (even 
after controlling for economic factors) provides significant 
explanatory power in explaining the extent of decoupling. In 
general, the findings support our theoretical perspective that 
decoupling is more likely to occur to the extent that (a) actors 
who hold power in the organization (i.e., CEOs vs. boards) 
have a political interest in avoiding institutional pressures for 
change and (b) social structural or experiential factors 
increase awareness among those actors of the potential for 
organizational decoupling. 
In terms of the antecedents of decoupling, we found that the 
relative power of the CEO vs. the board of directors is a sig- 
nificant predictor of decoupling of stock buyback programs. 
The greater the CEO's power over the board, the greater the 
extent to which firms decouple financial investments from 
formally adopted repurchase programs, so that the programs 
remain more symbolic than substantive. This finding is con- 
sistent with the view that tensions have arisen between the 
political interests of top managers, who seek to preserve 
managerial discretion over the allocation of corporate 
resources, and external institutional pressure from investors 
and other constituents to adopt (and presumably implement) 
policies such as repurchase programs that demonstrate com- 
mitment to shareholders by returning free cash flow to 
investors. It appears that firms are more likely to avoid insti- 
tutional pressures for change using tactics such as decou- 
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More generally, the significant effects of 
indirect board ties support the view 
expressed by Useem (1984) and others 
(e.g., Palmer, Friedland, and Singh, 1986) 
that boards of financial institutions can 
provide a clearinghouse for information 
on the business practices adopted by 
other companies. 
Decoupling 
pling when those institutional pressures conflict with the 
interests of actors who hold power in the organization. In the 
absence of such tension between external demands and the 
interests of powerful actors, the impetus for institutional 
decoupling would be significantly weaker. Institutional theo- 
rists have tended to view decoupling as a buffering mecha- 
nism whereby organizations maintain external legitimacy 
through formal practices that embody socially sanctioned pur- 
poses, while still preserving informal routines that have 
evolved over time (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981 b; 
Edelman, 1992). Our findings suggest that decoupling occurs 
not only because it may be effective for the organization but 
also because it serves the political interests of powerful cor- 
porate leaders. 
Our sociopolitical framework further addresses how social 
structural and experiential factors can augment political fac- 
tors as predictors of institutional decoupling. The results sup- 
port our theoretical perspective that board network ties to 
firms that have decoupled their buyback programs can 
increase managers' awareness of the potential to engage in 
symbolic action and preserve their discretion over the use of 
corporate resources. By providing information that reduces 
uncertainty about the consequences of engaging in symbolic 
vs. substantive action, network ties function as a vehicle for 
vicarious learning about avoidance as a response to institu- 
tional pressures. Moreover, these network effects general- 
ized across specific policies, such that ties to firms that 
engaged in decoupling in one policy domain (long-term incen- 
tive plans) increased the likelihood that firms would decouple 
a different but related policy (buyback programs) that had the 
similar ostensible benefit of reducing agency costs for the 
benefit of shareholders. Consistent with Mizruchi's (1992) 
finding that two-step board ties, as well as one-step ties, can 
lead to similarity in corporate behavior between firms, we 
found strong evidence that both one-step and two-step board 
ties to prior decouplers are associated with a greater likeli- 
hood of decoupling by the focal firm.5 
Beyond these main effects, we found evidence supporting 
our predictions on the interaction of CEO power and network 
ties, suggesting that the social structural context surrounding 
corporate leaders can amplify the effect of internal power 
relationships on organizational action or inaction, and decou- 
pling in particular. The results can also be understood as 
showing how interorganizational network effects (i.e., the 
spread of decoupling through interlocks) are moderated by 
internal power relationships. Our results highlight that the 
course of network diffusion of organizational activity across 
firms (in this case, decoupling vs. implementation of gover- 
nance policies) is not simply a natural contagion but is also 
affected by the interests of powerful actors. Organizational 
activity (or inactivity) spreads through network ties to firms 
with powerful actors who can benefit from it and is deflected 
away from firms with powerful actors who would not benefit 
from the activity or whose interests are compromised by it. 
More generally, these findings lend support to an emerging 
rapproachment between relatively macro-social, deterministic 
perspectives on organizational behavior and perspectives that 
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highlight the role of political interests (Granovetter, 1992; 
Scott, 1994: 75). In suggesting that networks are not simply 
conduits for information, our theoretical perspective and find- 
ings highlight the potential promise for future research on 
board networks in devoting greater attention to exploring 
how network effects on organizational action can be contin- 
gent on power relationships within the firm. 
One might question whether the influence of board interlock 
ties would be diminished when CEOs have power over the 
board, but CEO power does not imply that information from 
directors is not incorporated into the decision-making 
process. In a recent study, Westphal (1 999) showed that 
CEO power over the board can change the nature of the rela- 
tionship between the CEO and the board from independent 
board monitoring to a more collaborative working relationship 
in which the CEO seeks and encourages advice and counsel 
from directors on strategic issues. Thus, there is empirical 
evidence that CEO power does not decrease the use of infor- 
mation from directors in decision making, so that directors' 
experience can still be reflected in decision making when 
CEOs are powerful. At the same time, CEO power does 
decrease the likelihood that boards will independently take 
actions that threaten CEOs' interests, such as implementing 
stock repurchase programs. 
Additional findings showed how prior experience with decou- 
pling at the focal firm could influence the likelihood of subse- 
quent decoupling. In effect, just as network ties to firms that 
have decoupled buyback plans can raise awareness of the 
feasibility of decoupling and the potential for such symbolic 
action to serve managers' political interests, prior experience 
with decoupling at the focal firm can likewise reduce uncer- 
tainty about decoupling as a response to institutional pres- 
sures. As with the effect of board interlock ties, moreover, 
the effect of prior experience with decoupling extended 
across related policies: prior decoupling of LTIPs interacted 
with CEO power to predict subsequent decoupling of buy- 
back plans, which had a similar stated objective of constrain- 
ing managerial decision making for the benefit of 
shareholders. 
These findings provide the first evidence for institutional 
decoupling as a generalized, repeated practice in organiza- 
tions, such that decoupling may represent a generalizable 
decision-making routine that is applied to a variety of differ- 
ent policies over time. In addition, these findings may have 
implications for research on organizational earning and iner- 
tia. The interaction between CEO power over the board and 
prior decoupling experience is consistent with the view that, 
while prior experience with decoupling is likely to be encoded 
into organizational memory and routines, corporate leaders 
may draw on that experience selectively when it serves their 
political interests. Such selective learning from experience is 
consistent with recent theorizing that suggests that the 
selection and retention of routines that have been developed 
from experience is influenced by the interests and identities 
of powerful actors in the organization (March and Olsen, 
1989; Ocasio, 1999; March, Schultz, and Zhou, 2000). 
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Decoupling 
The results provided some evidence that prior decoupling of 
LTIPs has a stronger effect on repurchase plan implementa- 
tion than prior decoupling of repurchase plans. Perhaps some 
firms are more cautious about repeated decoupling of the 
same policy, based on a belief that such actions might 
increase the transparency of the decoupling, thus diminishing 
its value. In a separate study, however, we found no evi- 
dence that the stock market has discounted the value of 
repurchase plans as evidence of decoupling accumulated 
over time (Zajac and Westphal, 2001). It is also noteworthy 
that ownership by institutional investors was negatively relat- 
ed to repurchase plan implementation. Though higher levels 
of institutional investor ownership are often thought to indi- 
cate stronger external pressure for managerial accountability 
to shareholders (Hill and Hansen, 1991; Kaplan and Harrison, 
1993), our results suggest that while firms with large institu- 
tional owners may be more likely to adopt such policies, they 
are also less likely to implement them, so that the policies 
become more symbolic than substantive. This is consistent 
with recent research suggesting that institutional investor 
ownership is not necessarily a strong predictor of actual 
board influence over management (Westphal and Zajac, 
1998) and that institutional investors have not been fully suc- 
cessful in reforming corporate governance (e.g., Sundara- 
murthy, 1996; Porac, Wade, and Pollock, 1999). The typically 
large equity stakes that institutional investors hold may repre- 
sent both a financial and psychological commitment that 
makes exit more difficult for them. This commitment, when 
combined with their interest in the formal signs of good cor- 
porate governance, may make them more susceptible to 
symbolic corporate policies. 
The significant empirical support for our sociopolitical per- 
spective on the decoupling of stock repurchase programs 
from practice was obtained after controlling for a large num- 
ber of financial and economic factors, which enabled us to 
rule out a number of alternative explanations. While we 
believe our study represents the most comprehensive study 
to date on the potential predictors of stock repurchases, one 
could generate an almost endless list of additional reasons as 
to why firms might not have implemented an announced 
buyback (e.g., funds were needed for a new and unexpected 
internal R&D project, a surprise pricing war, a recently 
announced lawsuit, a new consulting report, etc.). While not 
denying the occasional influence of such factors, these types 
of random events are likely to be orthogonal to, and be thus 
unlikely to affect, the theoretically motivated and empirically 
demonstrated relationships between our political and social 
independent variables and our dependent variables, which 
were observed over hundreds of firms and across multiple 
time periods. 
This study extends significantly Westphal and Zajac's (1994) 
early work on the decoupling of long-term incentive plans, 
which is perhaps the only previous large-sample quantitative 
study that examines the determinants of institutional decou- 
pling. The current study develops a more complete perspec- 
tive on decoupling that considers how prior experience with 
decoupling on other boards or at the focal firm (by enhancing 
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awareness of the potential for symbolic action) can, along 
with political factors, predict decoupling. We have also con- 
sidered how experience with decoupling in one policy 
domain (LTIPs) can affect decoupling in a different domain 
(buybacks). Finally, the current study also hypothesizes and 
tests these determinants of decoupling in a wholly original 
context (i.e., stock repurchase plans) not previously examined 
in the organizational literature. 
Future research building on the framework and findings of 
this study could extend our sociopolitical framework on insti- 
tutional decoupling in several ways. For example, researchers 
interested in cross-cultural comparisons could examine the 
recent dramatic growth in stock repurchase programs among 
firms in European or Asian countries that have historically 
eschewed or even actively discouraged such programs (Wall 
Street Journal, 1997, 1 999b). This has coincided with the rise 
of the shareholder value orientation in these countries, which 
has also met with some macro-political (as well as micro- 
political) resistance abroad (Zajac and Fiss, 2001). Such ten- 
siohs may well result in an increase in observed decoupling 
in share repurchase programs for those firms. The assump- 
tion that there is a growing international convergence of 
shareholder-friendly governance practices (Useem, 1993) 
may benefit from closer scrutiny, since the presumed conver- 
gence may be more symbolic than substantive. 
In the U.S., one could begin to analyze, from a socio-political 
perspective, the many ways in which large U.S. corporations 
actively seek to use symbols to influence the perceptions of 
an important external constituency, i.e., shareholders. Sym- 
bolic action can range from relatively extreme forms of insti- 
tutional decoupling, such as the non-implementation of for- 
mal policies that affect the technical core of the organization 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977), to relatively subtle forms of 
decoupling that involve taking actions that are inconsistent 
with the spirit of a formal policy, although perhaps still con- 
sistent with the letter of the plan. The present study exam- 
ines a form of decoupling that falls within these extremes: 
the decoupling of repurchase plans can involve complete 
non-implementation, but the formal plans do not directly per- 
tain to the technical core of the organization. Even the busi- 
ness media (CNNfn, 1998) has characterized stock buyback 
announcements as "a potent tranquilizer" in the "remedial 
arsenal" of U.S. corporations that "can help reassure nervous 
investors." Future studies could extend our research by 
examining the determinants and consequences of more 
extreme forms of decoupling, as well as more subtle forms 
of symbolic action. For instance, researchers might examine 
the phenomenon of "earnings management," whereby firms 
invest considerable effort to smooth the appearance of their 
profitability over time to placate the investment community 
(Wall Street Journal, 1 999a). Given how high the stakes are 
for large corporations, it seems reasonable to expect that 
they will continue to develop new forms of symbolic action, 
including but not limited to institutional decoupling. The 
degree of the targets' receptivity to these symbolic actions is 
unknown, of course, but developing frameworks for estab- 
lishing both the antecedents and consequences of such 
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Decoupling 
actions appears to be an important first step toward gaining a 
greater understanding of their relevance. 
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